資本結(jié)構(gòu)對高管薪酬的影響研究

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摘要: 高級(jí)管理人員的薪酬管理問題一直是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論研究中備受關(guān)注的問題之一。如何提高企業(yè)高級(jí)管理人員的積極性，并有效避免人才流失和高管的短期行為，也是學(xué)者和專家們一直關(guān)注的難點(diǎn)和熱點(diǎn)問題。由于企業(yè)內(nèi)外生存環(huán)境較為復(fù)雜，加之公司股東與高級(jí)管理人員之間復(fù)雜的代理關(guān)系，故在企業(yè)所有者為高管制定薪酬時(shí)需要考慮多種因素。最新國內(nèi)外的理論與實(shí)證研究表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬之間存在一定相關(guān)性，資本結(jié)構(gòu)是高管薪酬的影響因素之一。本文的研究目的就是通過實(shí)證分析驗(yàn)證我國企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)對高管人員薪酬的影響。
本文首先對高管薪酬、資本結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)的概念及理論進(jìn)行梳理，同時(shí)以現(xiàn)金薪酬來衡量高管薪酬，以資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率來衡量資本結(jié)構(gòu)，研究現(xiàn)金薪酬與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率之間的關(guān)系。以2010年至2012年我國滬深兩市上市公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本，利用統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件對資本結(jié)構(gòu)和高管薪酬之間的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行多元線性回歸分析。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率和高管現(xiàn)金薪酬之間存在顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系;其他變量，如公司業(yè)績、公司規(guī)模以及行業(yè)等因素，也和高管薪酬存在一定的相關(guān)性。本文最后根據(jù)實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果，提出相應(yīng)的建議。

關(guān)鍵字：資本結(jié)構(gòu) 高管薪酬 上市公司

The Impact of Capital Structure on Managerial Compensation
Abstract: The problem of compensation management of senior management staff has been attracting much attention as one of the modern enterprise theory in question. How to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises senior management,and effectively avoid short-term behavior of brain drain and executives, difficult and hot problem is always concerned by scholars and experts. Because the enterprise survival environment is complex, the complex agent relation between shareholders and senior managers and business owners, so the payfor executives need to consider many factors. Theoretical and empirical research on the latest domestic and abroad show that, there is a certain correlation between capital structure and executive compensation, capitalstructure is one of the influential factors of executive compensation. The purpose of this research is to verify the effect of capital structure of Chineseenterprises to pay executives through empirical analysis.
This paper firstly on executive compensation, capital structure concept andtheory related to sort out, at the same time to cash compensation to measure the executive compensation, to measure capital structure to asset liability ratio,studies the relationship between cash compensation and the rate of assets and liabilities. The panel data from 2010 to 2012, China's Shanghai and Shenzhen two city listing Corporation as research sample, the correlationbetween capital structure and executive compensation by multiple linear regression analysis using the statistical software. The results showed: there was a significant negative correlation between the rate of assets and liabilitiesand top management cash compensation; other variables, such as the performance of the company, company scale and industry factors, andexecutive compensation has certain correlation. Finally, according to the results of empirical research, put forward the corresponding suggestion.

Key words: Capital Structure; Managerial Compensation; listed company

目 錄
引言 1
第一章 相關(guān)概念界定 2
1.1高管人員的界定 2
1.2高管薪酬的界定 3
1.3資本結(jié)構(gòu)的界定 3
第二章 理論分析與研究假設(shè) 5
2.1代理理論 5
2.1.1委托代理理論 5
2.1.2代理成本理論 5
2.2 負(fù)債治理效應(yīng) 6
2.3 研究假設(shè) 8
第三章 研究設(shè)計(jì) 9
3.1樣本選取與數(shù)據(jù)來源 9
3.2變量設(shè)計(jì) 9
3.3模型設(shè)計(jì) 12
第四章 實(shí)證分析 14
4.1描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 14
4.2相關(guān)性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 14
4.3回歸分析 15
4.4穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn) 19
第五章 研究結(jié)論與建議 20
5.1研究結(jié)論 20
5.2政策與建議 20
5.2.1經(jīng)理人才市場的建設(shè) 20
5.2.2完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu) 20
5.3研究的局限 21
參考文獻(xiàn) 21
致謝 23