上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬水平關(guān)系研究.doc
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上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬水平關(guān)系研究,15200字自己的原創(chuàng)畢業(yè)論文，僅在本站獨(dú)家提交，大家放心使用摘要隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立和社會(huì)主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，高管薪酬越來越受到人們的關(guān)注。在企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)出現(xiàn)分離的情況下，高管人員掌握著企業(yè)的實(shí)際資源，對公司的重大決策、經(jīng)營發(fā)展和價(jià)值創(chuàng)造都有著重大影響。因此，提高公司管理...
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上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬水平關(guān)系研究
15200字
自己的原創(chuàng)畢業(yè)論文，僅在本站獨(dú)家提交，大家放心使用
摘 要
隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立和社會(huì)主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，高管薪酬越來越受到人們的關(guān)注。在企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)出現(xiàn)分離的情況下，高管人員掌握著企業(yè)的實(shí)際資源，對公司的重大決策、經(jīng)營發(fā)展和價(jià)值創(chuàng)造都有著重大影響。因此，提高公司管理人員的積極性，避免企業(yè)人才流失，管理人員的短期行為，成為社會(huì)各界日益關(guān)注的話題，高管薪酬的影響因素的研究是必不可少的。同時(shí)，隨著我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的建立和完善，近年來我國上市公司高管薪酬逐漸趨于市場化定價(jià)，薪酬總額不斷提高。這一方面顯示了稀缺的高級管理人才的價(jià)值，對激起經(jīng)營管理者的工作熱情和刺激社會(huì)人力資本積累的動(dòng)力有著促進(jìn)作用，另一方面激增的高管薪酬又引起了對分配不均的討論。尤其是金融危機(jī)后，高管薪酬逆市而上，甚至顯示出與公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績的不一致性，引起社會(huì)的廣泛質(zhì)疑。那么研究我國上市公司高管薪酬的影響因素就勢在必行。在以往的文獻(xiàn)中資本結(jié)構(gòu)對高管薪酬的影響研究較少，但是從相關(guān)的研究中也能夠看出資本結(jié)構(gòu)對高管薪酬的影響是舉足輕重的，因此本文旨在研究資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬的關(guān)系。
本文在研讀相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，對高管薪酬和資本結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行理論分析，并據(jù)此設(shè)計(jì)出變量指標(biāo)，提出假設(shè)。之后選取2009 至 2012 年上海證券交易所上市的公司為研究樣本，并借助stata軟件對其進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，建立模型，剖析資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系。在實(shí)證研究中，通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析，分析出我國上市公司高管薪酬和資本結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀；進(jìn)行相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)，分析各變量之間的關(guān)系；最后進(jìn)行回歸分析，根據(jù)回歸結(jié)果分析資本結(jié)構(gòu)和高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系，并據(jù)此提出建議。
關(guān)鍵詞：高管薪酬 資本結(jié)構(gòu) 實(shí)證研究
ABSTRACT
With the establishment of the modern enterprise system and the development of the socialist market economy, people pay more and more attention to executive compensation. In the case of corporate ownership and management separation, executives hold the actual resources of the enterprise, and have a significant impact on the company's major decisions, business development and value creation. Therefore, improving corporate executives’ motivation, avoiding brain drain and short-term behavior of corporate executives, are becoming the social from all walks of life increasingly concerned about the topic. Studies of the factors which influence the executive compensation are indispensable. At the same time, with the establishment and perfection of market economy system in China, China's listing Corporation executive compensation gradually become market-oriented pricing in recent years , and total compensation also increase. This reflects the value of scarcity senior management personnel, and help to stimulate managers’ enthusiasm and stimulate power of social human capital accumulation. Especially after the financial crisis, executive compensation buck the trend, and even showed a non-matching with the management performance of the company, which causes social widespread questioning. Then, the study on China's listing Corporation executive compensation factors is imperative. In the past literature, the research about capital structure’s influence on executive compensation is few, but the related study also shows the influence of capital structure on executive compensation is essential. Therefore, this paper aims to study the relationship between capital structure and executive compensation.
Based on the relevant literature research, this article conducts the theoretical analysis on executive compensation and capital structure, and accordingly designs variables index, and makes assumptions. Then this paper selects 2009 to 2012 companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange as research samples, and makes an empirical analysis of it with the aid of stata software, and establishes the model, and analyses the relationship between capital structure and executive compensation. In the empirical study, the paper uses descriptive statistical analysis methods to analyze the status quo of China's listed companies’ executive compensation and capital structure; conducts correlation test to analyze the relationship between variables; finally, conducts regression analysis, and analyzes the relationship between capital structure and executive compensation based on the regression results, and make recommendations accordingly.
Key words：executive compensation capital structure empirical analysis
目 錄
引 言 - 1 -
1 資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬概述 - 1 -
1.1 資本結(jié)構(gòu)概述 - 2 -
1.2 高管人員概述 - 2 -
1.3 高管薪酬概述 - 2 -
1.4 上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬關(guān)系的理論分析 - 2 -
2 上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬關(guān)系實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì) - 4 -
2.1 樣本選擇和數(shù)據(jù)來源 - 4 -
2.2變量選擇 - 4 -
2.3假設(shè)提出 - 8 -
2.4模型構(gòu)建 - 8 -
3 上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬關(guān)系實(shí)證過程及結(jié)果分析 - 9 -
3.1 描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 - 9 -
3.1.1 高管薪酬的描述統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 - 10 -
3.1.2 資本結(jié)構(gòu)的描述統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 - 10 -
3.2 相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn) - 10 -
3.3 回歸分析 - 11 -
3.4 實(shí)證結(jié)果及分析 - 15 -
4 完善上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)，合理確定高管薪酬水平的建議 - 15 -
4.1 完善上市公司高管人員薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制 - 15 -
4.2 健全公司業(yè)績指標(biāo)評價(jià)體系 -..
15200字
自己的原創(chuàng)畢業(yè)論文，僅在本站獨(dú)家提交，大家放心使用
摘 要
隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立和社會(huì)主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，高管薪酬越來越受到人們的關(guān)注。在企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)出現(xiàn)分離的情況下，高管人員掌握著企業(yè)的實(shí)際資源，對公司的重大決策、經(jīng)營發(fā)展和價(jià)值創(chuàng)造都有著重大影響。因此，提高公司管理人員的積極性，避免企業(yè)人才流失，管理人員的短期行為，成為社會(huì)各界日益關(guān)注的話題，高管薪酬的影響因素的研究是必不可少的。同時(shí)，隨著我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的建立和完善，近年來我國上市公司高管薪酬逐漸趨于市場化定價(jià)，薪酬總額不斷提高。這一方面顯示了稀缺的高級管理人才的價(jià)值，對激起經(jīng)營管理者的工作熱情和刺激社會(huì)人力資本積累的動(dòng)力有著促進(jìn)作用，另一方面激增的高管薪酬又引起了對分配不均的討論。尤其是金融危機(jī)后，高管薪酬逆市而上，甚至顯示出與公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績的不一致性，引起社會(huì)的廣泛質(zhì)疑。那么研究我國上市公司高管薪酬的影響因素就勢在必行。在以往的文獻(xiàn)中資本結(jié)構(gòu)對高管薪酬的影響研究較少，但是從相關(guān)的研究中也能夠看出資本結(jié)構(gòu)對高管薪酬的影響是舉足輕重的，因此本文旨在研究資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬的關(guān)系。
本文在研讀相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，對高管薪酬和資本結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行理論分析，并據(jù)此設(shè)計(jì)出變量指標(biāo)，提出假設(shè)。之后選取2009 至 2012 年上海證券交易所上市的公司為研究樣本，并借助stata軟件對其進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，建立模型，剖析資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系。在實(shí)證研究中，通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析，分析出我國上市公司高管薪酬和資本結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀；進(jìn)行相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)，分析各變量之間的關(guān)系；最后進(jìn)行回歸分析，根據(jù)回歸結(jié)果分析資本結(jié)構(gòu)和高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系，并據(jù)此提出建議。
關(guān)鍵詞：高管薪酬 資本結(jié)構(gòu) 實(shí)證研究
ABSTRACT
With the establishment of the modern enterprise system and the development of the socialist market economy, people pay more and more attention to executive compensation. In the case of corporate ownership and management separation, executives hold the actual resources of the enterprise, and have a significant impact on the company's major decisions, business development and value creation. Therefore, improving corporate executives’ motivation, avoiding brain drain and short-term behavior of corporate executives, are becoming the social from all walks of life increasingly concerned about the topic. Studies of the factors which influence the executive compensation are indispensable. At the same time, with the establishment and perfection of market economy system in China, China's listing Corporation executive compensation gradually become market-oriented pricing in recent years , and total compensation also increase. This reflects the value of scarcity senior management personnel, and help to stimulate managers’ enthusiasm and stimulate power of social human capital accumulation. Especially after the financial crisis, executive compensation buck the trend, and even showed a non-matching with the management performance of the company, which causes social widespread questioning. Then, the study on China's listing Corporation executive compensation factors is imperative. In the past literature, the research about capital structure’s influence on executive compensation is few, but the related study also shows the influence of capital structure on executive compensation is essential. Therefore, this paper aims to study the relationship between capital structure and executive compensation.
Based on the relevant literature research, this article conducts the theoretical analysis on executive compensation and capital structure, and accordingly designs variables index, and makes assumptions. Then this paper selects 2009 to 2012 companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange as research samples, and makes an empirical analysis of it with the aid of stata software, and establishes the model, and analyses the relationship between capital structure and executive compensation. In the empirical study, the paper uses descriptive statistical analysis methods to analyze the status quo of China's listed companies’ executive compensation and capital structure; conducts correlation test to analyze the relationship between variables; finally, conducts regression analysis, and analyzes the relationship between capital structure and executive compensation based on the regression results, and make recommendations accordingly.
Key words：executive compensation capital structure empirical analysis
目 錄
引 言 - 1 -
1 資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬概述 - 1 -
1.1 資本結(jié)構(gòu)概述 - 2 -
1.2 高管人員概述 - 2 -
1.3 高管薪酬概述 - 2 -
1.4 上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬關(guān)系的理論分析 - 2 -
2 上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬關(guān)系實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì) - 4 -
2.1 樣本選擇和數(shù)據(jù)來源 - 4 -
2.2變量選擇 - 4 -
2.3假設(shè)提出 - 8 -
2.4模型構(gòu)建 - 8 -
3 上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬關(guān)系實(shí)證過程及結(jié)果分析 - 9 -
3.1 描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 - 9 -
3.1.1 高管薪酬的描述統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 - 10 -
3.1.2 資本結(jié)構(gòu)的描述統(tǒng)計(jì)分析 - 10 -
3.2 相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn) - 10 -
3.3 回歸分析 - 11 -
3.4 實(shí)證結(jié)果及分析 - 15 -
4 完善上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)，合理確定高管薪酬水平的建議 - 15 -
4.1 完善上市公司高管人員薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制 - 15 -
4.2 健全公司業(yè)績指標(biāo)評價(jià)體系 -..
