失真和最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)[外文翻譯]

包括中文翻譯和英文原文

中文：6345字
英文：23500字符


失真和最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)
喬治．貝克

摘要：績(jī)效測(cè)量是任何激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的重要組成部分。誠(chéng)信企業(yè)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制和組織中的價(jià)值是所可用的措施的強(qiáng)烈表現(xiàn)。然而，對(duì)有價(jià)值的性能措施的特點(diǎn)還沒有充分探討了文學(xué)社。在本文中，我使用一個(gè)多任務(wù)模型發(fā)展措施的效能兩個(gè)參數(shù)表征，并顯示如何將-兩個(gè)參數(shù)扭曲風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值和影響使用性能的措施在激勵(lì)合同。我表明，在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中設(shè)計(jì)許多有復(fù)雜的問題且卓有成效的激勵(lì)合同，可視為貿(mào)易這兩個(gè)功能的取舍性能的措施。我也使用這個(gè)框架來分析在提供獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的一些特定的環(huán)境，包括研發(fā)實(shí)驗(yàn)室和非營(yíng)利組織



Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts.
George Baker
Forthcoming, Journal of Human Resources
Abstract：Performance measurement is an essential part of the design of any incentive system. The strength and value of incentives in organizations are strongly affected by the performance measures available. Yet, the characteristics of valuable performance measures have not been well explored in the agency literature. In this paper, I use a multi-task model to develop a two-parameter characterization of performance measures and show how these two parameters distortion and risk affect the value and use of performance measures in incentive contracts. I show that many complex issues in the design of real world incentive contracts can be fruitfully viewed as trade-offs between these two features of performance measures. I also use this framework to analyze the provision of incentives in several specific environments, including R&D labs and non-profit organizations.
1. Introduction
The provision of incentives to individuals and groups in organizations is one of the central problems in the economics of the firm. A long and varied literature considers the question of what optimal incentive contracts look like (see Gibbons 1998, for a review). Most of this literature examines the use of "risky" performance measures, and as a result focuses on what Gibbons calls "the much studied trade-off between incentives and insurance." Yet, in most incentive contracts in the real world, risk is not a central issue: with the exception of stock-based plans for top executives, most compensation arrangements in fact impose very little risk on employees. In addition, as Predergast (2000) points out, the data do not confirm the existence of a trade-off between risk and incentives.