政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)[外文翻譯].rar
政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)[外文翻譯],[外文翻譯]政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)/government performance: lessons and challenges內(nèi)包含中文翻譯和英文原文，內(nèi)容完善，建議下載閱覽。①中文頁數(shù)4中文字數(shù)3410②英文頁數(shù)5英文字數(shù) 14142③ 摘要在過去二十年中，加強公共部門的業(yè)績已經(jīng)越來越緊迫，經(jīng)合組織成員國面臨著越來越...
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內(nèi)容介紹
原文檔由會員 鄭軍 發(fā)布
[外文翻譯]政府績效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)/Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges
內(nèi)包含中文翻譯和英文原文，內(nèi)容完善，建議下載閱覽。
①中文頁數(shù)4
中文字數(shù)3410
②英文頁數(shù)5
英文字數(shù) 14142
③ 摘要
在過去二十年中，加強公共部門的業(yè)績已經(jīng)越來越緊迫，經(jīng)合組織成員國面臨著越來越多的政府公共開支的需求，要求更高質(zhì)量的服務(wù)。而且，在一些國家，公眾越來越不愿意支付更高的稅款。為了應(yīng)對這些挑戰(zhàn)，各經(jīng)合組織國家都在爭取加強其公共部門的業(yè)績，并通過了一系列新的手段和管理方法來完善人員和機構(gòu)的預(yù)算編制。對于政府而言，其中包括將業(yè)績考核納入預(yù)算編制和管理，放寬輸入，控制公共部門的責(zé)任、職能，并通過與公務(wù)員簽訂合同和引進與業(yè)績相關(guān)的薪酬體制來改變公共就業(yè)模式。體制變革包括設(shè)立執(zhí)行機構(gòu)和為外包提供公共服務(wù)。本文集中于說明經(jīng)合組織國家實行業(yè)績?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的預(yù)算和績效管理。這樣的改革要求，推動了重點預(yù)算編制，防止管理和問責(zé)制遠離投入結(jié)果。為了提高性能及組織的靈活性，還要追究測量結(jié)果的形式和產(chǎn)出。提供業(yè)績信息的本身不是目的，而是為了更好地支持政界人士和公務(wù)員的決策，改進性能，并最終提高社會成果。提供給決策者的業(yè)績資料的數(shù)量已大幅度增加，但國家繼續(xù)監(jiān)管問題的質(zhì)量和確保該信息用于決策則需要時間來制定業(yè)績措施和指標，甚至要很長的時間才能改變行為中的關(guān)鍵角色系統(tǒng)（政客和官僚），使他們利用這一信息，并制定業(yè)績文化，以適應(yīng)她們的表現(xiàn)。明確政府的內(nèi)部和外部宗旨的好處和結(jié)果。但是，獲得這些好處政府需要一個長期的方針，切合實際的期望，并在期待中堅持。本文探討了以發(fā)展業(yè)績?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的預(yù)算編制，管理和報告，并論述了經(jīng)合組織國家發(fā)展的趨勢，優(yōu)勢和局限及現(xiàn)行做法和今后面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。
Over the past two decades,enhancing public sector performance has taken on a new urgency in OECD member countries as governments face mounting demands on public expenditure,calls for higher quality services and, in some countries , a public increasingly unwilling to pay higher taxes. To address these challenges , various OECD countries have sought to enhance their public sector performance by adopting a range of new levers and approaches to management, budgeting,personnel and institutional structures.Within government, these have included the introduction of performance measures into budgeting and management, the relaxation of input controls,the delegation of responsibility to line ministries/agencies, and changes in public employment typified by the adoption of contracts for public servants and the introduction of performance-related pay. Examples of institutional change include the creation of executive agencies and the privatisation or outsourcing of the provision of public services. This paper concentrates on attempts by OECD countries to introduce performance or results-based budgeting and performance management.This lever of reform seeks to move the focus of budgeting, management and accountability away from inputs towards results.Managers and/or organisations are given flexibility in order to improve performance and are then held accountable for results measured in the form of outputs and outcomes. The provision of performance information is not an end in itself; rather,its overall objective is to support better decision making by politicians and public servants leading to improved performance and/or accountability,and ultimately,enhanced outcomes for society.The quantity of performance information available to decision makers has substantially increased;however, countries continue to struggle with issues of quality and with ensuring that information is used in decision making. It takes time to develop performance measures and indicators, and even longer to change the behaviour of key actors in the system(politicians and bureaucrats)so that they use this information and develop a performance culture adapted to their particular country. The performance movement is here to stay.The benefits of being clearer inside and outside government about purposes and results are undeniable.But to gain these benefits governments need a long-term approach, realistic expectations,and persistence. This paper looks at the development of performance-based budgeting,management and reporting in OECD countries and identifies the trends, the strengths and the limitations of current approaches and future challenges. First it discusses the wider perspective of government performance.
④關(guān)鍵字 挑戰(zhàn)/Challenges
⑤參考文獻
Teresa Curristine,OECD Journal on Budgeting[J], 2005,(1):127-151
內(nèi)包含中文翻譯和英文原文，內(nèi)容完善，建議下載閱覽。
①中文頁數(shù)4
中文字數(shù)3410
②英文頁數(shù)5
英文字數(shù) 14142
③ 摘要
在過去二十年中，加強公共部門的業(yè)績已經(jīng)越來越緊迫，經(jīng)合組織成員國面臨著越來越多的政府公共開支的需求，要求更高質(zhì)量的服務(wù)。而且，在一些國家，公眾越來越不愿意支付更高的稅款。為了應(yīng)對這些挑戰(zhàn)，各經(jīng)合組織國家都在爭取加強其公共部門的業(yè)績，并通過了一系列新的手段和管理方法來完善人員和機構(gòu)的預(yù)算編制。對于政府而言，其中包括將業(yè)績考核納入預(yù)算編制和管理，放寬輸入，控制公共部門的責(zé)任、職能，并通過與公務(wù)員簽訂合同和引進與業(yè)績相關(guān)的薪酬體制來改變公共就業(yè)模式。體制變革包括設(shè)立執(zhí)行機構(gòu)和為外包提供公共服務(wù)。本文集中于說明經(jīng)合組織國家實行業(yè)績?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的預(yù)算和績效管理。這樣的改革要求，推動了重點預(yù)算編制，防止管理和問責(zé)制遠離投入結(jié)果。為了提高性能及組織的靈活性，還要追究測量結(jié)果的形式和產(chǎn)出。提供業(yè)績信息的本身不是目的，而是為了更好地支持政界人士和公務(wù)員的決策，改進性能，并最終提高社會成果。提供給決策者的業(yè)績資料的數(shù)量已大幅度增加，但國家繼續(xù)監(jiān)管問題的質(zhì)量和確保該信息用于決策則需要時間來制定業(yè)績措施和指標，甚至要很長的時間才能改變行為中的關(guān)鍵角色系統(tǒng)（政客和官僚），使他們利用這一信息，并制定業(yè)績文化，以適應(yīng)她們的表現(xiàn)。明確政府的內(nèi)部和外部宗旨的好處和結(jié)果。但是，獲得這些好處政府需要一個長期的方針，切合實際的期望，并在期待中堅持。本文探討了以發(fā)展業(yè)績?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的預(yù)算編制，管理和報告，并論述了經(jīng)合組織國家發(fā)展的趨勢，優(yōu)勢和局限及現(xiàn)行做法和今后面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。
Over the past two decades,enhancing public sector performance has taken on a new urgency in OECD member countries as governments face mounting demands on public expenditure,calls for higher quality services and, in some countries , a public increasingly unwilling to pay higher taxes. To address these challenges , various OECD countries have sought to enhance their public sector performance by adopting a range of new levers and approaches to management, budgeting,personnel and institutional structures.Within government, these have included the introduction of performance measures into budgeting and management, the relaxation of input controls,the delegation of responsibility to line ministries/agencies, and changes in public employment typified by the adoption of contracts for public servants and the introduction of performance-related pay. Examples of institutional change include the creation of executive agencies and the privatisation or outsourcing of the provision of public services. This paper concentrates on attempts by OECD countries to introduce performance or results-based budgeting and performance management.This lever of reform seeks to move the focus of budgeting, management and accountability away from inputs towards results.Managers and/or organisations are given flexibility in order to improve performance and are then held accountable for results measured in the form of outputs and outcomes. The provision of performance information is not an end in itself; rather,its overall objective is to support better decision making by politicians and public servants leading to improved performance and/or accountability,and ultimately,enhanced outcomes for society.The quantity of performance information available to decision makers has substantially increased;however, countries continue to struggle with issues of quality and with ensuring that information is used in decision making. It takes time to develop performance measures and indicators, and even longer to change the behaviour of key actors in the system(politicians and bureaucrats)so that they use this information and develop a performance culture adapted to their particular country. The performance movement is here to stay.The benefits of being clearer inside and outside government about purposes and results are undeniable.But to gain these benefits governments need a long-term approach, realistic expectations,and persistence. This paper looks at the development of performance-based budgeting,management and reporting in OECD countries and identifies the trends, the strengths and the limitations of current approaches and future challenges. First it discusses the wider perspective of government performance.
④關(guān)鍵字 挑戰(zhàn)/Challenges
⑤參考文獻
Teresa Curristine,OECD Journal on Budgeting[J], 2005,(1):127-151
